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Missile Defense

Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a "Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense initiatives more successful? Can such an application of science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable, necessary or impossible?

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wrcooper - 06:38pm Oct 10, 2003 EST (# 14775 of 14779)

It is useful to examine to arguments of the other side; in fact, it's essential, if opponents of the Bush plan hope to convince others to oppose it.

The Cato Institute, a right-wing think tank, published the following on countermeasures. Read the entire report at the page linked following: ____________________________________

Countermeasures

Countermeasures adopted by an adversary (sometimes also referred to as decoys or penetration aids) also affect the potential efficacy of NMD. Critics of NMD are usually quick to argue that the system could be easily fooled by countermeasures, which would be cheap and relatively easy to deploy. They contend that NMD interceptors would mistakenly attack the decoys instead of the incoming enemy warheads (reentry vehicles). Richard Garwin, a member of the Rumsfeld Commission, argues that “the NMD system under development would be unable to successfully engage 12 It would be foolish and premature to dismiss the threat from rogue states out of hand. reentry vehicles with penetration aids as rudimentary as enclosing a balloon around a warhead.” 38 In contrast, John Peller, Boeing’s Vice President and Program Manager for the NMD system, is of the opinion that only sophisticated reentry vehicles using advanced penetration aids could defeat the NMD system. “It will not be a simple penetration aid that gets through the system.”39 Peller contends that the optical discrimination of the NMD’s interceptor will allow it to combat a threat that encompasses the kind of capabilities that Third World countries or rogue states will be capable of when the initial NMD architecture is deployed. . . . This includes simple reentry vehicles with little or no penetration aids. It also includes some of the simpler threats out of China.40 But Peller also acknowledges that the initial NMD system will not be capable against “a more advanced threat with more sophisticated penetration aids”—that is, Russian ICBMs and SLBMs.41 The subject of countermeasures is very technical, usually classified in nature, and beyond the scope of this analysis.42 There are, however, some important facts to understand about countermeasures. First, any NMD system will probably have at least two different media for the detection and discrimination of incoming warheads—radar and infrared (IR). For the NMD system to be fooled, effective countermeasures would have to successfully simulate both the radar and IR signatures of a real warhead. Such sophisticated countermeasures are unlikely to be easily deployed by rogue states of the Third World. Second, the ability to deploy countermeasures is highly dependent on the size (payload and throw weight) of the missile. There has to be space to accommodate both warhead(s) and countermeasures. Thus, offensive missile systems must be designed with countermeasures in mind—they cannot be added as an afterthought. And the additional weight of any countermeasures may reduce the range of the missile. The missiles that rogue states might develop are unlikely to have both the capacity to carry countermeasures and the range to strike the United States. The effective use of countermeasures therefore will present significant technical and operational obstacles for rogue states to overcome. And although more countries are acquiring ballistic missiles (particularly longrange missiles), it is not clear that they are pursuing or integrating countermeasure technology into the missiles.

http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-337es.html

wrcooper - 06:41pm Oct 10, 2003 EST (# 14776 of 14779)

Notice the passage in the Cato Institute report, quoted above, that said, "First, any NMD system will probably have at least two different media for the detection and discrimination of incoming warheads—radar and infrared (IR). For the NMD system to be fooled, effective countermeasures would have to successfully simulate both the radar and IR signatures of a real warhead. Such sophisticated countermeasures are unlikely to be easily deployed by rogue states of the Third World. "

This is not true.

It has been demonstrated by the UCS and others that effective countermeasures would weight little and occupy only a small part of the space in the nose cone of an ICBM. The ballons, their inflators, and heaters would be compact and lightweight. See the UCS site (linked in a previous post) for specifics.

wrcooper - 07:25pm Oct 10, 2003 EST (# 14777 of 14779)

Oops.

That's "weigh," not "weight".

(2 following messages)

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