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Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a
nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a
"Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed
considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense
initiatives more successful? Can such an application of
science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable,
necessary or impossible?
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wrcooper
- 12:53pm Oct 8, 2003 EST (#
14661 of 14663)
CONTINUED
General Ronald Kadish, the current Director of BMDO, relies
on the most recent "Welch Report" to buttress his position
that the best approach to NMD development is an incremental
one: although "design discrimination capabilities are adequate
to meet the defined C-1 [Capability 1] threat. . . more
advanced decoy suites are likely to escalate the
discrimination challenge" [emphasis added]. General Kadish
told the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 29, 2000 that
"should we choose to add the additional sophistication" the
EKV can handle more sophisticated decoys.
General Kadish did acknowledge that the NMD program is on a
high risk schedule as it has compressed the normal DoD
acquisition cycle from the usual 15 or more years to 8
(1997-2005). But he also believes, in quoting the latest Welch
Report, that "the technical capability is available to develop
and field the limited system to meet the defined C-1 threat"
consisting of unsophisticated countermeasures [emphasis
added]. Considering that the "hit-to-kill" approach leaves no
room for error, many regard this "defined" threat as defining
away the problem.
Sea-Based Boost Phase NMD Since the discrimination problem
seems the most contentious, many analysts, including former
Secretaries of Defense John Deutch and Harold Brown and former
Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, are pushing the
development of a shipborne NMD system. The advantage claimed
for a sea-based system is mobility-a ship can loiter off the
coast of a threat nation ready to fire interceptors as soon as
a launch is detected. This would theoretically catch a missile
in its boost phase (which for offensive intercontinental
missiles lasts between two and five minutes) while the hostile
missile is traveling at a relatively slow speed, presents a
high infrared profile, and is well before any deployment of
its warheads and decoys. The difficulties with a sea-based
system are:
1) The ship must be properly positioned so that its
intercept envelope overlaps the threat missile's flight
envelope. Ships positioned off North Korea's coast, for
instance, would have difficulty trying to knock down an ICBM
launched from that country over the North Pole. 2) To be
properly positioned for intercept, ships would be confined to
a relatively small "box," making the vessel easier to locate
and attack. 3) The ship's crew would have to be at continuous
"battle stations" to ensure that a defensive strike during
boost phase could be executed at any time. The option of
frequently rotating ships would require a number of additional
ships-probably three for every one on station-which would
rapidly add to NMD costs. 4) A defensive missile will be
"chasing" the threat missile rather than intercepting it,
which means the NMD booster must have greater speed.
Furthermore, it must be clear quickly that the missile being
tracked by the Navy is hostile and not just an unannounced
test or space vehicle. 5) In terms of current technology, the
Standard Missile, the "weapon" element in the Navy's evolving
theater missile defense system, is not robust enough to act as
an NMD-class interceptor. Conversely, the land-based
interceptor being developed is too large for the vertical
launch tubes on Navy cruisers and destroyers; they could only
fit in Trident launch tubes on Ohio-Class ballistic missile
submarines.
MORE
wrcooper
- 12:54pm Oct 8, 2003 EST (#
14662 of 14663)
CONTINUED
Lasers as NMD Boost Phase Interceptors Although currently
planned as a defense against theater missiles, a second
alternative being touted for NMD boost phase intercept is the
Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL). The program has been under
pressure from Congress because of technical hurdles that
stymied development for some time, and the Air Force has
other, higher priorities. Again, mobility is a plus, but the
laser must be powerful enough and sufficiently focused to burn
into the ascending rocket from afar. Considering that the new
Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile is predicted to have a
range of some 250 miles, the ABL must be able to knock out an
ascending missile from at least this "stand-off distance" to
avoid being threatened by an adversary's air defense systems,
including long range fighters. In March 2000 the Air Force
said it had overcome the problem of optical turbulence that
had been a major technological hurdle in laser development. As
with the sea-based system, however, there are questions as to
how many planes will be needed to provide defensive coverage
24 hours a day in times of tension.
The Air Force had planned to demonstrate the viability of
the program with a "shoot down" of a target in 2003, but this
schedule could be delayed from one to three years because of
financial constraints. This in turn would delay equipping the
seven modified Boeing 747s the Air Force had originally
planned to field starting in 2007.
Looking further into the future-out to 2020-some NMD
advocates have been calling for space-based lasers (SBL) for
boost phase intercepts as part of a multi-tiered missile
defense shield. Theoretically, lessons from the ABL program
could be incorporated into a SBL. The ABL prototype uses a
laser generated from a chemical base, which may not be as
feasible for the projected SBL. Until mid-July 2000, studies
on system architecture and designing a vehicle for possible
testing in 2012 were underway. Then, in its latest future
roadmap entitled "Global Vigilance, Reach and Power," the Air
Force omitted references to a deployed SBL target date of
2020.
Conclusions
The six complex NMD parts must perform perfectly as
separate parts and then mesh perfectly if the system is to
successfully intercept a hostile missile. Two of three
attempts to intercept a mock intercontinental range missile
have failed and the third was a "qualified" success. As a
result, the future test schedule is very fluid. Technology is
proving to be the brake on deployment. Discrimination-the
ability to distinguish real warheads from decoys-seems to be
the most complex and controversial technological hurdle. Boost
phase intercepts, while theoretically appealing as a solution
to the discrimination problem, have a number of practical
considerations that make this a questionable "solution."
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