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 [F] New York Times on the Web Forums  / Science  /

    Missile Defense

Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a "Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense initiatives more successful? Can such an application of science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable, necessary or impossible?

Read Debates, a new Web-only feature culled from Readers' Opinions, published every Thursday.


Earliest Messages Previous Messages Recent Messages Outline (14660 previous messages)

wrcooper - 12:53pm Oct 8, 2003 EST (# 14661 of 14663)

CONTINUED

General Ronald Kadish, the current Director of BMDO, relies on the most recent "Welch Report" to buttress his position that the best approach to NMD development is an incremental one: although "design discrimination capabilities are adequate to meet the defined C-1 [Capability 1] threat. . . more advanced decoy suites are likely to escalate the discrimination challenge" [emphasis added]. General Kadish told the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 29, 2000 that "should we choose to add the additional sophistication" the EKV can handle more sophisticated decoys.

General Kadish did acknowledge that the NMD program is on a high risk schedule as it has compressed the normal DoD acquisition cycle from the usual 15 or more years to 8 (1997-2005). But he also believes, in quoting the latest Welch Report, that "the technical capability is available to develop and field the limited system to meet the defined C-1 threat" consisting of unsophisticated countermeasures [emphasis added]. Considering that the "hit-to-kill" approach leaves no room for error, many regard this "defined" threat as defining away the problem.

Sea-Based Boost Phase NMD Since the discrimination problem seems the most contentious, many analysts, including former Secretaries of Defense John Deutch and Harold Brown and former Deputy Secretary of Defense John White, are pushing the development of a shipborne NMD system. The advantage claimed for a sea-based system is mobility-a ship can loiter off the coast of a threat nation ready to fire interceptors as soon as a launch is detected. This would theoretically catch a missile in its boost phase (which for offensive intercontinental missiles lasts between two and five minutes) while the hostile missile is traveling at a relatively slow speed, presents a high infrared profile, and is well before any deployment of its warheads and decoys. The difficulties with a sea-based system are:

1) The ship must be properly positioned so that its intercept envelope overlaps the threat missile's flight envelope. Ships positioned off North Korea's coast, for instance, would have difficulty trying to knock down an ICBM launched from that country over the North Pole. 2) To be properly positioned for intercept, ships would be confined to a relatively small "box," making the vessel easier to locate and attack. 3) The ship's crew would have to be at continuous "battle stations" to ensure that a defensive strike during boost phase could be executed at any time. The option of frequently rotating ships would require a number of additional ships-probably three for every one on station-which would rapidly add to NMD costs. 4) A defensive missile will be "chasing" the threat missile rather than intercepting it, which means the NMD booster must have greater speed. Furthermore, it must be clear quickly that the missile being tracked by the Navy is hostile and not just an unannounced test or space vehicle. 5) In terms of current technology, the Standard Missile, the "weapon" element in the Navy's evolving theater missile defense system, is not robust enough to act as an NMD-class interceptor. Conversely, the land-based interceptor being developed is too large for the vertical launch tubes on Navy cruisers and destroyers; they could only fit in Trident launch tubes on Ohio-Class ballistic missile submarines.

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wrcooper - 12:54pm Oct 8, 2003 EST (# 14662 of 14663)

CONTINUED

Lasers as NMD Boost Phase Interceptors Although currently planned as a defense against theater missiles, a second alternative being touted for NMD boost phase intercept is the Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL). The program has been under pressure from Congress because of technical hurdles that stymied development for some time, and the Air Force has other, higher priorities. Again, mobility is a plus, but the laser must be powerful enough and sufficiently focused to burn into the ascending rocket from afar. Considering that the new Russian S-400 surface-to-air missile is predicted to have a range of some 250 miles, the ABL must be able to knock out an ascending missile from at least this "stand-off distance" to avoid being threatened by an adversary's air defense systems, including long range fighters. In March 2000 the Air Force said it had overcome the problem of optical turbulence that had been a major technological hurdle in laser development. As with the sea-based system, however, there are questions as to how many planes will be needed to provide defensive coverage 24 hours a day in times of tension.

The Air Force had planned to demonstrate the viability of the program with a "shoot down" of a target in 2003, but this schedule could be delayed from one to three years because of financial constraints. This in turn would delay equipping the seven modified Boeing 747s the Air Force had originally planned to field starting in 2007.

Looking further into the future-out to 2020-some NMD advocates have been calling for space-based lasers (SBL) for boost phase intercepts as part of a multi-tiered missile defense shield. Theoretically, lessons from the ABL program could be incorporated into a SBL. The ABL prototype uses a laser generated from a chemical base, which may not be as feasible for the projected SBL. Until mid-July 2000, studies on system architecture and designing a vehicle for possible testing in 2012 were underway. Then, in its latest future roadmap entitled "Global Vigilance, Reach and Power," the Air Force omitted references to a deployed SBL target date of 2020.

Conclusions

The six complex NMD parts must perform perfectly as separate parts and then mesh perfectly if the system is to successfully intercept a hostile missile. Two of three attempts to intercept a mock intercontinental range missile have failed and the third was a "qualified" success. As a result, the future test schedule is very fluid. Technology is proving to be the brake on deployment. Discrimination-the ability to distinguish real warheads from decoys-seems to be the most complex and controversial technological hurdle. Boost phase intercepts, while theoretically appealing as a solution to the discrimination problem, have a number of practical considerations that make this a questionable "solution."

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 [F] New York Times on the Web Forums  / Science  / Missile Defense