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Missile Defense

Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a "Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense initiatives more successful? Can such an application of science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable, necessary or impossible?

Read Debates, a new Web-only feature culled from Readers' Opinions, published every Thursday.

rshow55 - 07:06pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11567 of 11581)

So far, some rather limited stunts, very far from what would be required even to meet program objectives, is all that have been achieved. At great cost.

When you look at what has been done, and the "countermeasures" used -- and relate it to the many things left to be done - I can only ask -- this is success? It looks more like evidence of failure, to me.

Of coures, "to work" like other words, depends on context.

Can Missile Defense Work? By Steven Weinberg http://www.nybooks.com/articles/15132 The New York Review of Books February 14, 2002 ... is a very careful piece on missile defense. Weinberg thinks that, in a weak sense, the programs might work -- that is, meet unrealistically defined program goals, rather than tactically interesting goals.

Weinberg ends:

" . . In seeking to deploy a national missile defense aimed at an implausible threat, a defense that would have dubious effectiveness against even that threat, and that on balance would harm our security more than it helps it, the Bush administration seems to be pursuing a pure rather than applied missile defense— a missile defense that is undertaken for its own sake, rather than for any application it may have in defending our country. (emphasis added.)

Is this what you mean by work?

gisterme - 07:19pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11568 of 11581)

Summing up discussion about this interview of Mr. Rumsfeld by Senator Kennedy:

http://www.aip.org/enews/fyi/2001/009.html

rshow55 2/15/02 3:15pm

Robert says:

"...I was asked by gisterme to set out key assumptions that I think Secretary Rumsfeld makes:

1. The assumption that "sticking with it" is always a good answer.

Based on the transcript of the intrview, no such "always" assumption was made. Mr. Rumsfeld suggested that we shoud stick to what we're doing with BMD despite some failures because the prospects of success are great. He cited the Corona project from the 60's as an example of a similar development project that paid off despite many early failures. The fundamental assumptions driving the suggestion are that there is a threat and therefore a need for MD.

"...2. The assumption that we have a correct and complete understanding of deterrence and responses to threat fit to the situations we're thinking about..."

No such assumption was made or is even suggested based on the text of the transcript. You shouldn't attribute your feelings to the Secretary of Devfense, Robert.

3. The assumption that we will gain by backing missile defense even if we can't convince people that MD is credible, and make it work. Still reasonable, it seems to me.

No such assumption was made or is even suggested based on the text of the transcript. You shouldn't attribute your feelings to the Secretary of Devfense. It makes you look dishonest, Robert

"...Still reasonable, it seems to me."

You advertise your poor reading comprehension, Robert. Anybody who reads that transcript and compares what you think Mr. Rumsfeld's assumptions are to what's said there, regardless of their position on NMD, would have to agree.

Here are the assumptions that Mr. Rumsfeld makes in that interview:

1. There is a threat that justifies MD development.

2. A NMD system can be built to deal with that threat. We shouldn't give up just because it isn't easy.

3. Deterrance is a viable concept within the assymetric context. A viable NMD would discourage development and use of ballistic missiles as a means of delivering WMD, even if the perpatrator of an attack did not expect to survive.

That's about all I see. Everything else in the interveiw stems from those "big three". Anybody else care to comment?

gisterme - 07:28pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11569 of 11581)

"...So far, some rather limited stunts, very far from what would be required even to meet program objectives, is all that have been achieved. At great cost..."

I'd call intercepting and destroying an incoming ballistic vehicle more than an stunt under any conditions. That's not an easy thing to do.

I notice you didn't bother to answer my previous question...given my assumtion that countermeasures can be defeated:

please explain...how would "tactical conditions" be much different than "test conditions" in those already hostile regions [space & upper atmosphere] of BMD engagement?

gisterme 2/12/02 8:59pm

gisterme - 07:28pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11570 of 11581)

Gotta go.

rshow55 - 08:15pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11571 of 11581)

Space is a difficult environment, all right.

In the Coyle Report, there's a tremendous amount of detail about the difficulty of handling even rather simple countermeasures --- and the contortions that have to be made, to say that the mid-course interception system can handle countermeasures at all.

Your assumption that countermeasures can be defeated is a big one.

On a program on which we are placing such heavy bets (not only "a couple of hundred billion dollars" -- but also the security of the country, that might be served in other ways) how about checking, rather than assuming?

I stand by my statement of assumptions that Rumsfeld is making. He's assuming that the system can be made to work in a reasonable tactical sense. That implicit assumption, whether he's conscious of it or not, is key.

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