New York Times on the Web Forums Science

Missile Defense

Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a "Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense initiatives more successful? Can such an application of science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable, necessary or impossible?

Read Debates, a new Web-only feature culled from Readers' Opinions, published every Thursday.

rshow55 - 03:15pm Feb 15, 2002 EST (#11557 of 11565)

MD11541-11545 rshow55 2/14/02 6:49pm are clear. If you read them, you may be surprised by gisterme's sense of balance.

I've been arguing for getting facts, and facts on which assumptions rest, checked. Gisterme , for a very long time, in many ways -- has been saying -- no checking - not in any way that can't be manipulated-- you have to trust us.

Ken Lay said that, too. For a long time, it worked. But the consequences could have been improved.

If you read gisterme's responses after MD11545, you might conclude (s)he cares about rational risks, and would care about countermeasures "if only they weren't secret" -- (or perhaps -- if only they were credible.) I don't know if that would be a fair assumption. But whatever gisterme may say, it is reasonable to ask how effective systems can be, under realisitic conditions.

Such as when warheads are encased in balloons that look like the decoy balloons. An idea that's been suggested for many years, by many people. No secret. The "eyes" of the EKV that are the core of the Bush BMD program can't cope with that. The "countermeasures" the program might cope with are few, and unrealistic.

Balloons can be made reflective -- reflectance of 98% (for mylar covered gold, a standard material used in space for thirty five years or more) -- or, perhaps with moderate development, made of more reflective material still. Missiles may also be covered with similar reflective material. The reflectance MUCH reduces the ablility to find these targets (emissivity is 1-reflectivity), and much reduces the vulnerability of these targets to lasers.

Could these simple countermeasures be developed for 200K, (or as I also suggested 2 million$, or 20 million) --- a millionth, a hundred thousandth, or a ten-thousandth of the BMD systems that they could very effectively counter? Gisterme's answer is to go onto a discussion, mostly irrelevant, about how little could be done for 200K. On how expensive testing is -- a good argument for not investing in programs with no tactical merit.

I have background where I know what things cost --perhaps roughly as well as gisterme does. For some time, a former VP of Engineering from Ford Motor Company worked for me. (Ford has one VP of Engineering at a time.) But no great sophistication is required. Some jobs aren't difficult. Balloon making is sophisticated -- if you doubt it, go to a parade, and look at some of the floats. You can buy a lot of balloon development, and a lot of gold mylar, for 200k. (Much more for larger sums -- still tiny sums beside the cost of the BMD systems they neutralize.)

I was asked by gisterme to set out key assumptions that I think Secretary Rumsfeld makes:

1. The assumption that "sticking with it" is always a good answer.

2. The assumption that we have a correct and complete understanding of deterrence and responses to threat fit to the situations we're thinking about.

3. The assumption that we will gain by backing missile defense even if we can't convince people that MD is credible, and make it work.

Still reasonable, it seems to me.

This thread goes on - - and I don't feel like being hurried.

(8 following messages)

New York Times on the Web Forums Science Missile Defense