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Missile Defense

Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a "Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense initiatives more successful? Can such an application of science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable, necessary or impossible?

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rshow55 - 07:16am Feb 9, 2002 EST (#11386 of 11394)

I do. And the question isn't - "if defense spending had to be adjusted down . . . " I'm not at all sure I'd argue that DOD needs to get smaller, just now - but I'd sure argue for reallocation. If spending had to be reallocated, to meet clear national needs (whether aggregate expenditure was to be changed or not) what thinking strategies (analytical tools, ways of thinking, ways of talking) are needed, that don't exist now, but that could improve decision making, from where we are, directly, clearly and quickly?

If Rumsfeld, or Rice, or Bush, or military commanders are asked to "do the best they can" -- how do they do it? What does the question mean? Do they know? How can they know better?

If "doing the best they can" is to be meaningful, it has to be meaningful, step by step, at all the levels of aggregation or detail that real action and coordination takes.

From the time I was eighteen, I've been asked to think about such problems -- because military people have known how valuable analytical tools can be. And have known when they had them, and sometimes known when they didn't have them.

For instance, linear programming was developed, by PMS Blackett and others in the early 1940's to do military jobs -- and it has made an important difference in the world. The military uses linear programming optimization well. If a problem really can validly mapped to a system of linear equations, the military really can find optimal solutions - and does routinely. But what about problems that don't map into such a simple model? Some very concerned people asked me questions involved with that in the late 1960's and early 70's -- what about nonlinear, disjoint, and complex circumstances involving the uncertainty of risk and the uncertainty that comes with incomplete information, involving time, logical connections, and costs - - and involving real people, with real human limitations?

Satisfactory answers can't be too highafaluting - they have to be usable. They have to be made to connect to ordinary, everyday patterns of thinking, that people can think with, and communicate with, clearly, surely, and comfortably.

rshow55 - 07:17am Feb 9, 2002 EST (#11387 of 11394)

A quote from C.P.Snow's SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT often goes through my head, and does now. Here it is, bolded, and put into its context. (Chapter 11)

"I could go on accumulating negatives and empirical prescriptions. We know something about what not to do and who not to pick. We can collect quite a few working tips from the Tizard-Lindemann story. For instance, the prime importance, in any crisis of action, of being positive what you want to do and of being able to explain it. It is not so relevant whether you are right or wrong. That is a second-order effect. But it is cardinal that you should be positive. In the radar struggle Tizard and his committee were positive that theirs was the only hope, and Lindemann had only quibbles and fragmentary ideas to set against it. Over bombing, Lindemann was positive that he had the recipe to win the war. Tizard was sure he was wrong, but had nothing so simple and unified to put in its place. Even at the highest level of decision, men do not relish the complexity of brute reality, and they will hare after a simple concept whenever one shows its head."

Patterns of ideas have to work in people's heads. And people, to act, need confidence, so follows "the prime importance, in any crisis of action, of being positive what you want to do and of being able to explain it."

But it matters -- it can be a matter of life and death -- that answers be arrived at that are sensible, rather than disastrously wrong.

Some while ago, I gave an "imaginary briefing" on this thread, based on the question "what could I tell Putin, that would be useful for Russia, and the prosperity of the world?" I assumed that Putin was acting in good faith, from his country's point of view, and from some broader human points of view, and would try to do the best that he could actually do - could actually figure out to do.

I'd like to review that briefing, and set out some analogous ideas, about optimization, that I wish Rumsfeld, Rice, Bush, and other American leaders could understand.

rshow55 - 07:35am Feb 9, 2002 EST (#11388 of 11394)

We need something related to the notion of "shadow pricing" - that permits us to compare, and choose between, options with estimated payoffs, costs, risk discounts (because of risk or incomplete information) and time periods.

We need to do this in a way where we can use knowledge we have -- about limitation of things, and characteristics of real people and real organizations.

It isn't hopeless, or even that difficult. I think, with a little effort, we could do a lot better than we've been doing -- better at meeting objectives that Americans share.

We need such tools to get us out of messes, and to get better outcomes.

Missile defense is a very good example, and an important one. Not the only one. William A. Owens and Stanley A. Weiss wrote an Op Ed piece Feb 7th -- An Indefensible Military Budget" -- which ends:

" We and all Americans can agree with the president that we must spend whatever it costs to defend our nation. But no amount will be enough if we cannot spend our military dollars more efficiently.

To do that, we have to be clearer than we are about what "efficiency" means -- with the choices, complexities, and constraints, material and human, that are really there.

We need to answer the questions:

what are payoffs?

what are costs?

what are the risk and uncertainty discounts? ...and

what time is involved?

We need to have answers to these questions, applied to the choices before us.

We need to be able to use those answers, or estimates, in an organized and sensible way. We ned to be able to order the choices before us. And we need to be able to do some simple sorts - to rule out things that clearly aren't worth doing -- and specify things that have to be done, on any rational accounting.

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