New York Times on the Web Forums Science

Missile Defense

Technology has always found its greatest consumer in a nation's war and defense efforts. Since the last attempts at a "Star Wars" defense system, has technology changed considerably enough to make the latest Missile Defense initiatives more successful? Can such an application of science be successful? Is a militarized space inevitable, necessary or impossible?

rshow55 - 04:33pm Jan 5, 2002 EST (#10655 of 10673)

I was very glad to see gisterme 1/3/02 7:57pm and said so in http://talk.guardian.co.uk/WebX?14@@.ee7a163/262

People who've followed this forum will know that gisterme and I have had some disagreements in the past, and we don't agree on everything now. But I had some very positive feelings, reading gisterme's post above.

We agree that (taken in isolation)

"One powerful argument in favor of an effective ballistic missile defense is that it would eliminate the effect of a small-scale launch whether that launch was by accident or by conspiracy. "

Even so, we disagree about how important that argument can be in context, when the real technical possibliities involved are considered. I remain much more pessimistic about those technical possibilities than gisterme , for reasons I've posted before.

We disagree significantly about the risks and probabilities.

When evaluating risksit makes sense to follow economists, actuaries, statisticians, gamblers, and many soldiers, and consider "risk" as the product of (estimates of) probability of occurrance TIMES the cost of the occurrance. Call it

P x C

I might agree with gisterme that the probability that "one, two or a few bombs may fall into the hands of evil men who just want to spill blood" may be greater than the probability of "an accident or sabotage initiated large scale launch." (I wouldn't be confident about that agreement.) Suppose we grant that this "one or two bomb" scenario has a much higher probability of occurrance than a large scale launch.

Even so, the cost of the "one or two bomb" scenario, at worst, is of the order of 10 million dead, and proportionate devastation. Call that C1

To imagine C1, imagine actually looking at the three thousand dead from the WTC - at 5 seconds average attention each, that would be more than four hours, without breaks.

Then, count to 3300, at each count remembering that you are adding another number of human deaths, with a similar set of human connections.

This is a lot of work -- enough to be wrenching, but enough to give a sense of both the magnitude of the human loss, and your own imaginative limits in taking it in. If you've done such a thing, you can, within human limits, roughly and weakly appreciate what 10 million deaths would mean.

The cost of a large scale launch might well be the end of the species, and of most higher forms of animal life. Score that (with a small allowance for the unborn) as 10 billion dead. Call that C2 = 1000 x C1

Though this is an inimaginably larger number, you'd get some (rough and weak) sense of it, counting to 1000 -- with each count, this time, standing for 10 million deaths.

rshow55 - 04:34pm Jan 5, 2002 EST (#10656 of 10673)

For what it is worth, by November of last year my personal judgement of the probability of a large scale launch was about 10% per year. On an actuarial basis, that works out to rougly 35 WTC death equivalents per hour. That thought kept me interested in this thread.

Some of the reasons I thought the risk was so great have been set out here before. I could discuss them again.

I believe that the risk of death from large scale launch is less now, because communication between Russia and America is better, because Russia is running better, and because Americans are more clear morally, viscerally, and intellectually about the seriousness of mass death. Whatever the risk (in WTC death equivalents per hour) was last year, I think the risk less now.

But not so much less that I dismiss that risk. I feel that it is urgent for us to get "strategic nuclear arsenals reduced to the point where even the worst case would still allow survival of the species. "

When things fall apart, worst cases aren't unlikely, with control systems built to fire in the way nuclear weapon systems are built to fire. Those systems were built so that in the chaos and emotion of a nuclear exchange they fire. Twenty years ago, I daresay that any of 100 people, if determined and crazy enough, could have set off American missiles (probably most easily, the ones on subs, but the land based ones aren't so invulnerable either.) Is is so much better today? How safe are the Russian controls? How many ways are there to screw up these old and obsolete systems? Enough, I believe, for serious worry.

rshow55 - 04:35pm Jan 5, 2002 EST (#10657 of 10673)

Gisterme , you and I agree that reducing ALL nuclear risks is very important. But I think I'm, on balance, a good deal more concerned than you are. And we disagree on the technical prospects of the missile defense programs now (at least at the level of rough specification) announced to the public. I don't think these "Star Wars" systems, as now consistituted, have even one chance in a thousand of working as an effective missile shield. I think there ARE other ways of reducing our risks that would actually work

We should concentrate on reducing our total risk, and do so with costs in mind -- because our resources are limited, and because the risks are so very serious.

Gisterme won't be surprised that we've got these disagreements. All the same, I was very pleased to read gisterme 1/3/02 7:57pm , and glad to know that gisterme is "entirely with (me) in wanting to see strategic nuclear arsenals reduced to the point where even the worst case would still allow survival of the species. That might not take as long as we may think."

I hope it doesn't. Since the big stockpiles are useless, why not make the reduction to species survival level quickly? What's to be gained by delay? Delay might lose our whole world.

(16 following messages)

New York Times on the Web Forums Science Missile Defense